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Adapting the DIPLOMACY Board Game Concept 
for 21st Century International Relations Teaching 
 
The classical board game DIPLOMACY (Avalon Hill / Hasbro) was developed by Allan 
B. Calhamer (Calhamer, 1999) in the 1950s. For decades, it has been a popular board 
game, postal game and online game. DIPLOMACY has also been used as a teaching 
platform for international relations (IR), diplomacy and dynamic decision-making (Asal, 
2005; Eskin, 2004; Gattie, 2004).  
While many aspects of the game make it useful for university IR teaching, there are 
also some shortcomings. DIPLOMACY has been considered a close approximation of an 
anarchical self-help world, where states ultimately can rely only on themselves, other 
protagonists’ words can never be fully trusted and betrayal of promises frequently occurs. 
While this may have been a relatively accurate description of the ruthless pre-WWI 
European secret diplomacy, which the game depicts, and that Woodrow Wilson so 
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security-centered international diplomacy is tenuous, at best. Realism has a long history 
as foreign policy practice and as an IR theory. However, the dog-eat-dog world portrayed 
in DIPLOMACY is not particularly useful as a simulation of actual contemporaneous 
international relations—unless you happen to be stationed in Syria.  
If we see game design through the prism of simulation-as-microworld (Rieber, 
1996; Romme, 2004) and the aim is to construct a good learning environment for 
international relations through the parameters and rules created within this microworld, 
then the original DIPLOMACY design can be improved upon. Niv-Solomon et al. (2009) 
have shown that actors participating in international, simulated negotiations adapt to the 
rules and norms of the interaction environment. Other researchers have similarly 
indicated that changing the game rules in an IR role-playing game can produce a game 
outcome that follows a different theoretical logic (Tamai et al., 2016). 
In my application of the DIPLOMACY board game to university teaching, I have 
adapted the game in several ways to make it more useful for IR teaching purposes, beyond 
letting students experience the realist worldview. New elements include team play, 
employing a dedicated peace mediator team, altering win rules to enable mediated and 
negotiated outcomes, and adding post game debriefing discussions on different cultures 
of anarchy. The result has been a well-integrated course that students have highly 
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of students have considered the course better than more traditional forms of learning, and 
several students have spontaneously indicated that it is the best or one of the best courses 
that they have ever attended. 
 
Board Games and Negotiation Simulations as Teaching Tools 
In recent years, there has been increased scholarly interest in using both purpose-designed 
(Mason & Patterson, 2012; Huang & Levinson, 2012; Männarmaa, 2015; Hoy, 2018) and 
classical board games (Drake & Sung, 2011; Paino & Chin, 2011) in university teaching. 
Classical board games can be powerful teaching tools due to their simplicity, constrained 
game play and transparency (Zagal et al., 2006). In contrast, one of the limitations of a 
computer-based game such as CIVILIZATION, which has also been used to teach IR, is 
its complexity and the required time-commitment to learn the game (Weir & Baranowski, 
2011). However, sometimes the original board game logic and rules need to be modified 
to better suit educational purposes. For example, Paino and Chin successfully modified 
MONOPOLY for use in an undergraduate deviance class to teach difficult material, 
especially critical theory (Paino & Chin, 2011). Similarly, Coghlan and Huggins (2004) 
modified MONOPOLY to emphasize structural inequalities by dividing the class into 
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DIPLOMACY differs from many other strategy board games in ways that make it 
appropriate for educational purposes. The game rules are strategic, abstract and simple, 
which underlines its character as a simulation of negotiations and puts emphasis on social 
interaction skills. Various negotiation simulations are commonly used as teaching tools, 
and their pedagogical usefulness has long been documented in educational literature 
(Rieber, 1996; Hess, 1999; Brown & King, 2000). In gaming simulations, students own 
activity and discussions are central to the learning experience. They represent the 
instructional artifact that most closely matches the characteristics that research has shown 
to be related to intrinsic motivation and motivating learning environments: curiosity, 
challenge, fantasy and control (Rieber, 1996; Vermunt, 2007). Simulations enliven the 
contents taught, clarify theory and activate students to use their own thinking and 
judgment through the competitive element typically involved. They are a form of active 
learning, and a sub-set of problem-based learning (Hess 1999; Brown & King, 2000; Asal, 
2005; Loggins, 2009; Kauneckis and Auer, 2013).  
One advantage of good simulation games is that they approximate real world 
decision-making with all its complexity, human interaction, interdependence, wheeling 
and dealing, uncertainty and compromises. However, a disadvantage of low-tech and no-
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not possible to store large quantities of information for analysis purposes, or replay 
scenarios (Mayer, 2009).  
While students are often able to think abstractly about the various elements involved 
in foreign policy decision-making, they tend to forget about this complexity when 
analyzing real world political situations (Loggins, 2009; Hudson, 2014). Despite its 
relatively simple game rules, DIPLOMACY underlines the complexity involved in 
foreign policy decision-making. Negotiations, psychology, cooperation and game 
theoretical thinking figure prominently in DIPLOMACY, which makes the game 
inherently useful to IR teaching, especially from an actor perspective. Game orders are 
resolved simultaneously, which mimics actual real-time behavior and makes the game a 
good low-cost simulation of dynamic decision-making (Gattie, 2004; cf. Kuperman, 
2010). Furthermore, the game contains no chance elements, apart from the initial draw of 
the country played.  
However, DIPLOMACY has its limitations when it comes to teaching. One 
limitation is a common problem with using games in teaching: that the medium (game) 
becomes too dominant in relation to the pedagogical purposes, that is, the game and 
learning process are not integrated well enough (Asal, 2005). A related problem is the 
gaming the game phenomenon of students adopting a gamer mode that is optimal for 
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may become so absorbed with the game itself that, while playing the game gives 
enjoyment, it also interferes with the learning objectives (Rieber & Noah, 2008). 
A second, more DIPLOMACY–specific shortcoming, is the game’s approximation 
of a worldview akin to an extreme version of realism, which (ironically) is not a realistic 
depiction of international relations in the 21st century. One of the advantages of 
DIPLOMACY is that it allows students to reflect between the world created by the game’s 
rules, the world as described by IR theories and students’ own worldviews. The game has 
previously been used in IR teaching mainly to allow students a chance to reflect on how 
the world would work if it worked in the way that realism assumes it does. Pedagogically, 
the game has been regarded as a useful simulation especially because it tends to spur 
fierce class discussions on realism (Asal, 2005).  
In the original game set-up players follow the famous realist maxim by Thucydides 
that ”the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”. Showing students 
how quickly they get engulfed by the logic of a self-help world, is educational in itself—
leading to a deeper understanding of realpolitik, or power political behaviour (Johnston, 
1995), that students can then debate, and reject if they wish. Nonetheless, the game can 
be criticized for naturalizing an actor-oriented perspective, which makes thinking of IR 
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Among current IR theories, the basic logic of DIPLOMACY mimics relatively 
closely John Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism. Mearsheimer’s position, while 
influential, is not a mainstream position among IR scholars, especially in Europe, which 
broadly adheres to more constructivist notions. Mearsheimer essentially argues that 
international relations have not fundamentally changed in character from what they have 
been throughout the ages. In an anarchic world, states are still primarily oriented towards 
power and their own security and can ultimately only rely on themselves (self-help). Great 
powers look for opportunities to gain power over each other, that is they care more about 
relative than absolute gains and take advantage of opportunities to increase their relative 
power whenever they can, that is, they are revisionists at their core. This point sets 
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism apart from the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz, 
which tends to regard states as more status quo –oriented (maintaining their position 
within the system through balance-of-power and other means). 
In DIPLOMACY, the Mearsheimer worldview is accentuated and overemphasizes 
the conflictual nature of international relations. Individual players ceaselessly try to gain 
an advantage over each other by taking and controlling supply centers on the board 
through military moves and engaging in negotiations and verbal as well as non-verbal 
signaling, which includes lies and the breaking of promises. Since the system is anarchic, 
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war may break out at any time and “unfit” actors will be eliminated through conquest, 
while stronger players will tend to engage in power-balancing (Wendt, 2010: 265–266). 
Being nice is not a recipe for game success. One of the infamous features of 
DIPLOMACY is that it tends to bring out strong emotions and may even ruin social 
relationships (Eskin, 2004; Asal, 2005). Successful game play is usually a combination 
of negotiation skills, a strategic eye and engendering trust, while biding one’s time and 
breaking commitments only when the benefits outweigh the costs. Importantly, however, 
it is almost impossible to win the game without breaking promises at some point. The 
trick is to do it sparingly and at opportune moments. In other words, backstabbing is an 
advantageous competitive manoeuver in an otherwise cooperative game (Zagal et al., 
2006).  
I believe that the microcosm created by the original game rules can be improved 
upon by both showing the logic of how a realist self-help world operates, and then letting 
students discover and debate alternatives. In this context, constructivist IR scholar 
Alexander Wendt’s notion of cultures of anarchy has been useful. Building on earlier 
work by English School theorists (Wight, 1991; Bull, 1995), Wendt showed that, while 
realists tend to believe that the anarchical system forces its members (states) to behave in 
certain ways in order to survive, the anarchical self-help system of realism is only one 
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based on enmity. Other basic possibilities were a Lockean culture based on rivalry and a 
Kantian culture based on friendship. Instead of seeing the structure of the international 
system in materialist terms, as Mearsheimer and Waltz do, Wendt understands this 
structure as forming the system’s culture. Furthermore, this culture can take several forms 
and may be internalized by participants in the system to various degrees, depending on 
whether internalization is based mainly on force, self-interest or legitimacy (Wendt, 
2010). In my courses, I have incorporated the cultures of anarchy -concept to post-game 
debriefing discussions. Debriefing discussions serve an important role in deepening 
learning (Crookall, 2010). 
 
Course Design and Game Modifications 
In my course design that utilizes the board game version of DIPLOMACY, I have 
attempted to address these two shortcomings. To address the first problem, I designed the 
course so that all teaching and learning elements support each other, and so that the game 
forms a natural part of the learning process, rather than being only tangentially related to 
the taught content. While game-related negotiations form an integral part of the teaching 
concept, it would not work well without the other course elements, which include regular 
lectures and class discussions, a compulsory literature package (ca 600 pages), weekly 
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learning diary and two-way feedback. All in all, the course has consisted of seven 1,5-
hour lectures and a maximum of 10 hours of game play. 
Teaching and learning proceed on several levels and connections between these 
levels are actively sought and developed. Given that the course is an IR course, real-time 
topical world events are also brought into the discussions (for example related to Syria, 
North-Korea, China or Ukraine). The compulsory course syllabus contains literature that 
relates to various aspects of the game and is designed to broadly follow the course of the 
game. The course literature begins with sections from books that deal with the history of 
diplomatic negotiations of the time and follows up with theoretical literature on the 
diplomatic negotiation process and on geopolitics and balance of power. It then turns to 
consider political psychology and decision-makers, comparative collective security 
arrangements, as well as historical causality and counterfactuals. Finally students read up 
on Wendt’s different logics of anarchy.  
The course has been designed as a very intensive, continuously on-going activity. 
Before each lecture, the week’s compulsory reading is digested. The literature is 
discussed in an interactive class, including in small groups. Towards the end of the 
lecture, a weekly discussion assignment is given. The lecture is followed by a lunch break, 
after which students play the board game for two hours in class. In between lecture and 
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additional materials that the teacher provides online, participate in the online discussion, 
wage game-related negotiations and conduct public diplomacy (in the online learning 
environment), as well as write their course diary. The learning model I implemented 
shares some elements with the flipped classroom notion, although differs in other aspects.  
In the final evaluation, the course diary, game performance, online discussion and 
class activity all account for 25 % of the final grade. The course finishes with a thorough 
debriefing and feedback lecture. Students analyze each other’s game strategies and styles, 
how the actions of others have been interpreted, as well as reflect on the learning 
experience. These post-game debriefing discussions have been most illuminating, as 
students often discover that other players interpret their actions differently from how they 
themselves perceive these actions; for example, someone might inadvertently signal 
distrust even when trying to send messages of trust. Students thus also learn about 
themselves and their own behavior under time-pressures and stress. In the course diary, 
the objective is to bring all the elements of the course together; from the course literature 
through class discussions and game events to real-time world events. Students are given 
much latitude in determining how they write the course diary and creativity is emphasized 
as an evaluation criteria.   
The second, more game-specific shortcoming of DIPLOMACY as an IR teaching 
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in the 21st century, nor normatively desirable; a world breeding on distrust, the breaking 
of commitments and might-makes-right type behavior. In order to remedy this 
shortcoming, I introduced several elements that are not available in the original game 
design. Table 1 summarizes the main modifications introduced to the game in order to 
make it more suitable for IR teaching.  
 






Single player Team play Practicing intra-team 
negotiations (domestic politics)  
— Peace mediator 
team 
Developing peace-making skills 
Winning by 
board domination 




Emphasizing the game’s 
negotiation aspects instead of its 
strategic aspects; removing the 





Showing that the game logic 
approximating offensive realism 
is only one possibility and that by 
altering the goals and dynamic 
different logics may emerge 
 
Students play in two-player teams instead of individually, which further emphasizes the 
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politics” into negotiations. Robert Putnam famously argued that international relations is 
a two-level game that takes place both in diplomatic negotiations and in domestic politics 
settings. International agreements also need to be sold domestically (Putnam, 1988). 
Teams have to agree internally on their intra-team roles (for example, chief negotiator 
and chief strategist) and resolve potential internal disputes that sometimes occur, 
especially given time-constraints. In the course design, players do not get to choose their 
own team-mates. They are assigned to a team alphabetically. Sometimes teams develop 
into a well working duo. At other times, differences in personality, game style preferences 
and ways of reading the game and other players cause visible frictions that are either 
resolved or affect game performance. 
DIPLOMACY is a negotiation simulation more than a war simulation. Ultimately 
the game objective is to dominate the game board. As the game rules state “in order to 
survive, a player needs help from others. In order to win the game, a player must 
eventually stand alone.” (DIPLOMACY game rules) The game objective is thus not 
conducive to reaching a negotiated and shared solution. After all, who would gladly want 
to accept terms that are dictated by someone who has conquered more than half of 
everything? That situation is more akin to the terms handed down by military victors 
following unconditional surrender by their enemies, rather than the more mundane give-
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with agreement (usually because of stalemated situations), in this case, no peacemakers 
are employed and all players share equally in the draw.  
To remedy this shortcoming, I introduced another self-developed game element: a 
special peace-mediating team. During the first course, I experimented with assigning a 
peace-making role to the team who was first dropped out of the game. However, this did 
not work well. The students assigned to this new role had trouble switching from being 
players in the game to being mediators, and other players did not regard them as neutral 
arbiters. In subsequent courses, I have assigned the peace-mediating role to one team from 
the start, which has worked much better. Players, who are dropped out of the game, still 
retain the option of joining the peace mediating team, if they wish. 
At the beginning of the game, the role of peace mediators is peripheral, as students 
typically are excited about playing the game and certainly not interested in finding a quick 
way to end it. As the game wears on and battle fatigue sets in, the role of neutral peace 
mediators grows. This mimics the real thing. Typically, war-waging parties are not 
interested in making peace as long as the battlefield situation is in flux and gains can be 
expected from continued fighting. When events on the battlefield become bogged down, 
casualties and costs grow and no end is in sight through continued fighting. Under such 
circumstances, peace mediators may find combatants more ready to use their services.  
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modification to the winning rule. Instead of winning by domination or draw, the game 
can also be ended by a negotiated solution, whereby all teams remaining in the game 
agree on the rank order of teams. This allows for and encourages a negotiated solution 
instead of a winner-takes-all outcome. The peace deal needs to be agreed in writing and 
signed by all combatant parties still left in the game. The negotiated final ranking also 
needs to be reflected on the game board, if need be by effecting orderly withdrawals and 
ceding territory to comply with the negotiated agreement. While no actual prizes are given 
to game winners, success in the game has a slight effect on the final grade, as it accounts 
for a quarter of it. More important than this seems to be the social prestige gained among 
fellow students by performing well in the game. 
Both times that we used peace mediators in the described way, the game ended in 
a negotiated agreement with the assistance of peace mediators. However, the 2016 peace 
mediators failed spectacularly in their first attempt at peace negotiations. Having learned 
some lessons, for the second attempt the peace-mediating team had done its homework 
and worked out a very meticulous plan for peace. The plan was implemented through a 
round of sequenced negotiations that managed to eventually get everyone on board, 
despite hesitancy on the part of one team (Russia), which looked set to jolt up from second 
to first place if the game had continued.  
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contributing factor was undoubtedly battle fatigue that was setting in, given that the game 
had been emotionally taxing. Peace mediators proposed a peace plan, which all but one 
team was ready to accept. The Italian team took an assertive stance and initially refused 
to accept the agreement, unless another team gave them a chunk of territory. The other 
team quickly dismissed this as an opportunistic move and refused to give in. The Italian 
team eventually gave up on their demands and accepted the agreement. 
Recent research on diplomatic signaling has suggested that making higher demands 
can increase perceptions of a state’s resolve to fight for better outcomes under two 
conditions. Negotiating parties must share in the bargaining surplus from avoiding war, 
which tends to occur in a bargaining process, or when goods are only partially divisible. 
Furthermore, higher demands must be less likely to be accepted even if the threat is 
credible, that is, compromise may prove impossible, even if the alternative is war. These 
conditions also entail that less resolved conflict parties do not necessarily have an 
incentive to imitate such signals. When the adversary is believed unlikely to accede to 
maximalist demands, offers of compromise will be made, even though this signals 
weakness. Signaling weakness is acceptable to less resolved states when they perceive 
that maximalist demands are likely to lead to no concession, whereas moderate demands 
are more likely to lead to moderate concessions (Trager, 2017).  
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between the United States and China in 2018 is illustrative, with U.S. President Trump 
signaling a willingness to fight a trade war by making outrageous demands, and China 
(as the less resolved party) trying to avoid a trade war and look for avenues of compromise 
through more moderate demands. 
Finally, one last addition to the game is that for the last lecture students are required 
to read a section from a seminal book by Alexander Wendt on cultures of anarchy 
(Wendt, 2010). This is then discussed both in class and online. The game trajectory 
mimics a shift from enmity with zero-sum logic and pervasive security dilemmas towards 
rivalry, where gains can be negotiated and divided, albeit not quite reaching the point of 
building Kantian peaceful security communities. In the online discussion, students ponder 
which logic (or combination of logics) they envision will prevail in future real-world 
international relations.  
One of the most interesting findings to emerge from these debriefings is that only 
one student (out of 31 students) has seen future international relations moving in the 
direction of a Hobbesian logic of anarchy, and even he placed the argument in the context 
of history moving in cycles, with the Hobbesian trend currently prevailing. Given that the 
same students have just spent several weeks engaged in a Hobbesian struggle to eliminate 
opponents and dominate the DIPLOMACY game, and real-world events in Syria, North 
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is somewhat surprising. The most common view was that the future is open or will most 
likely be a combination of different logics (usually with the Hobbesian logic as the 
weakest element). The second-most common view was that the future would approximate 
the Lockean notion of rivalry. Two students (out of 31 students) even envisioned a more 
Kantian future. Since no pre-course survey on student attitudes was undertaken, it is not 
possible to deduce to what extent the course impacted on these views. However, at the 
very least one might tentatively conclude that playing DIPLOMACY in the manner done 
on this course did not seem to turn students into offensive realists. On the contrary, some 
students indicated in their feedback that they thought the syllabus should have included 
more non-realist literature.  
 An intriguing possibility for further theoretical development of DIPLOMACY 
would be to allow also for a Kantian ending, for example by introducing a third win-
condition, that of successfully establishing and maintaining a security community among 
some or all teams. This would be a community, where members do not fight each other, 
but rather live in peace and welcome others to join their community, although they may 
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Table 2. A proposal for three educational ways to end a DIPLOMACY game: 
Underlying logic of 
anarchy 
Process of ending the game Outcome 
Hobbesian  
(enmity) 
Winning by conquering over 










Gradual establishment and 
maintenance of a security 
community 
All teams participating in 
the security community 
share equally in the win 
   
In a much-noted essay, Robert Cooper (2000) suggested that our world is composed of 
pre-modern, modern and post-modern states. The first operated in a Hobbesian world. 
Modern states (such as China and Russia) adhere to the sovereignty-emphasizing 
Lockean world established in Peace of Westphalia 1648. In contrast, many European 
states have been attempting to transcend sovereignty and build an ever-expanding 
security community of peaceful relations.  
In DIPLOMACY, players initially inhabit a Hobbesian world. Against this 
background, an interesting event unfolded during one course. A student team, who had 
played an aggressive early game but for which the game was not going well, suddenly 
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this was a rather transparent bid to avert being eliminated from the game and other teams 
were still immersed in the Hobbesian logic, the move floundered disastrously. However, 
what if students are told initially that a Kantian world is also possible and one team 
proclaims a commitment to neutrality from the start? The outcome may turn out different. 
Instead of forcing students to play by the original Hobbesian logic, such a game 
modification would allow students to choose their worldview and corresponding game 
strategy. It would turn the game into a contest over different ways of structuring state 
relations. Students could thus even attempt to transform the logic of anarchy into a 
Kantian one, which Wendt argues is difficult, but not impossible. Wendt argues that the 
building blocks for such a cultural change are a realization of interdependence, common 




Discussion of Student Feedback and Teaching Experiences 
In terms of student activity and motivation, my DIPLOMACY-based course design has 
been a success. I have collected systematic student feedback on all three courses using 
the same feedback form. In the beginning of the course, students have been made aware 
that the course design is experimental and that the teacher may therefore later use 
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A consent form has been attached to the anonymous student feedback forms. Students 
have had the opportunity to deny that their anonymous written feedback be used for 
research purposes (only one student did not return a positive consent form).  
The first course in 2015 was a trial, on the basis of which I refined the teaching 
concept. Based on student feedback, the concept is now mature in the sense that after the 
last course students found little to improve in the concept. Many students either left the 
areas to improve -section blank or noted that they could not think of any way that the 
concept could be further refined. The areas where small improvements could still be made 
were mainly related to choice of course reading materials and how to activate students in 
online discussions. The last course also garnered an unusually high average score for all 
the evaluated areas (4.83/5.00). A summary of the numerical course feedback from all 
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As % of 
maximum 
score 
Course content 4.60 92.0 % 
Technical implementation 4.36 87.2 % 
Teacher expertise 4.95 99.0 % 
Teaching style 4.56 91.2 % 
Course as a whole 4.57 91.4 % 
Average 4.61 92.2 % 
Student responses (n) and 
response rate 
42 
(F 22, M 20) 
93.3 % 
Note: In the feedback form, an equidistant Likert-type scale from 1–5 has been used, where 1 
signifies poor and 5 excellent (n = 210 separate grades). This scale was used as students’ own 
course performances are graded with the same scale. It is, therefore, both familiar to them and 
widely used.  
 
The course evaluation has consistently been better than for other courses that I have taught 
at the same department at the same time (students overlap). In particular, the 4.83 average 
evaluation for the last game course is extraordinarily high both in absolute terms and in 
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to have an average evaluation in the range of 4.30–4.40.   
In the written sections of feedback forms, students have expressed in numerous 
ways that the teaching concept works well. In a subjective evaluation of whether students 
think that they have learned the contents better through the game-based course, compared 
to a regular lecture course or independent reading of course material, almost all students 
have indicated that the course concept works better. Slightly more students said that they 
would have learned as well also through independent study (Table 4).   
Students have appreciated, in particular, the interactive nature of the course, the 
variety in teaching and learning methods used, as well as a generally positive and 
encouraging atmosphere conducive to learning. While many students ”confess” to having 
been initially attracted to the course mainly because of the possibility to play 
DIPLOMACY, often such feedback has been accompanied by comments saying that, in 
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Table 4. Course design compared to alternative learning options (open-ended 
questions on student feedback form) 
 Yes Equally well or 
ambivalent 
No 
Do you think you learned the 
taught material better in this 
course compared to a more 








Do you think you learned the 
taught material better in this 
course compared to reading 








Note: As these were open-ended questions, students did not necessarily answer just with a simple 
yes / no. Instead, students provided their view on why the course was (or was not) better than the 
alternative, so answers have been interpreted. In most cases, the answers were clear-cut. If 
answers were ambivalent or argued both ways, they are counted in the second bracket.  
i The only student who gave a clear no-answer added that this was mainly because of her own 
challenging life situation, which did not allow her to fully concentrate on her studies. 
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lecture course.1  The high activity level and motivation of students is essential, as a 
successful use of simulations in teaching requires that all, or at least most, of students are 
motivated to attend (Moizer et al., 2009; Asal, 2005). The risk of low attendance was 
reduced by pre-registration and compulsory attendance. However, probably just as 
effective as these means was the fact that many students registering for the course had 
heard positive things about the course in advance from other students.2 Students showed 
a high level of commitment and took ownership of their own learning experience—factors 
which in educational research have been shown to promote learning (Carini et al., 2006; 
Vermunt, 2007).  
The high attendance requirements, in conjunction with the game limitations 
themselves also mean that the number of students attending the course cannot easily be 
raised from the current level of 14–16 students. It should also be noted that the course is 
quite demanding for students and an intense experience. Overall, student feedback 
																																																								
1 Student absence ratios have been 3.0 %, 10.0 % and 3.9 %, mainly due to sickness and pre-
arranged travel. 
2 The course garnered media attention by a story featured on the main national evening TV news 
and in two local news articles. The course was also nominated for the University’s Course of the 
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indicates that the course is thought of as rewarding and highly educative, but also 
emotionally exhausting. 
 
Changing the Rules of the IR Game 
This article has described an elective IR teaching course applying the DIPLOMACY 
board game that I have designed and taught at the undergraduate level for three 
consecutive years. I utilized DIPLOMACY in a manner that involves all three elements 
of real diplomacy: negotiation, signaling and public diplomacy (Rourke, 1999). In my 
experience, DIPLOMACY enables the teacher to concretely illustrate several central and 
cumbersome problems intimately related to the field. For example, how difficult it is to 
establish and maintain trust, and how easy it is to lose trust. Or how difficult it is to 
construct workable and durable international cooperation when interests are opposite and 
no higher instance enforces agreements (that is, no court system or world government). 
Students get hands-on experience in making difficult decisions under time-pressure and 
circumstances where no optimal solutions are available. The influence of cognitive 
limitations (for example, preconceptions, bounded rationality, prejudices and heuristic 
fallacies) on decision-making will also be readily apparent, enabling students to reflect 
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While others have also used DIPLOMACY in IR teaching, this article focused on 
how I altered game play in order to make it more suitable for IR education. Through a 
comprehensive, integrative and interactive course design, I attempted to overcome a 
common shortcoming of using games in teaching, that is, that their relationship to the 
educational aims is only tangential, or that playing the game comes to dominate over the 
learning objectives. The second area of changes relates to more specific concerns of IR 
teaching, as well as the nature of DIPLOMACY itself. To make the game more useful for 
IR teaching, I introduced four specific modifications: 1) team play, 2) a dedicated peace 
mediator team, 3) altered win rules, and 4) post-game discussion of the Wendtian notion 
of cultures of anarchy.  
Through these four game modifications, students were able to turn a game that is 
infamous for its backstabbing and breaking of promises into a game that resolves in a 
mediated and negotiated peaceful agreement. By altering the rules, students were able to 
overcome the gamer mode trap of behaving very differently (for example, more 
aggressively or deceptively) in the game than they would in real life (Frank, 2012). If we 
regard DIPLOMACY as a microworld simulation of real international relations, these 
findings suggest that by the described tweaks to the game, DIPLOMACY can be useful 
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The field of international relations was born out of the carnage of the First World 
War, grew up in the shadow of the Second World War and matured during the Cold War. 
Issues of war and peace are integral to the endeavor, and normative considerations never 
far away. It matters how we teach our students about the field. Instead of teaching as if 
real-world international relations were subject to some timeless and objective laws of 
state-centered realism, it is more fruitful to let students experience first-hand how 
compelling the logic of realism can be when international relations have been structured 
along self-help lines, and then let them understand that this is but one way of structuring 
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